








Is there a fade-away effect of initial nonresponse  





































Nonresponse in surveys may result in a distortion of the distribution
of interest. In a panel survey the participation behavior in later waves is
different from the participation behavior at the start. With register data
that cover also the information for non-respondents one can observe a fade
away of the distributional differences between the distribution of the full
sample, including nonresponders, and the respondent sample, without the
nonrespondents.
The mechanics of this effect may be explained by a Markov chain
model. Under suitable regularity conditions the distribution on the state
space converges to the steady state distribution of the chain, which is
independent from the starting distribution of the chain. Therefore the
fade-away effect is considered here as the swing-in into the steady state
distribution.
An essential condition for the fade-away effect assumes the same tran-
sition law for the responders and the nonresponders. Such a hypothesis is
investigated here for the Finnish subsample of EU-SILC for the equival-
ized household net-income. The income is grouped into income brackets
which divides the starting sample into quintiles. This analysis is based
on register information. For this analysis the null-hypothesis of equal
transition behavior between income quintiles for responders and nonre-
sponders cannot be rejected. This finding restates a result for Finland for
the ECHP (European Community Household Panel).
A second condition concerns the selectivity of panel attrition after
wave one. Here panel attrition must not depend on the income state of
the previous panel wave.
The velocity of the swing-in into the steady state distribution depends
on the stability to stay in the same income state. The stability may vary
among the European countries. Therefore we investigated the transition
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matrices for 25 EU-SILC countries. We simulated 6 different pattern of
nonresponse bias and investigated the fade-away effect across the waves
2006 to 2009. We found remarkable differences between these 25 coun-
tries. Expressed by the relative bias, i.e. bias in 2009 divided by bias
at start in 2006, we found a reduction down to 26 percent of the initial
bias for Bulgaria (foremost reduction) up to 61 percent for Finland (least
reduction). Our results vote for longer observation periods in rotation
panels like EU-SILC.
Keywords: Panel surveys, nonresponse, panel attrition, Markov chains,
income mobility, EU-SILC.
1 Introduction
Nonresponse reduces not only case numbers of a survey but it may also dis-
tort the results of survey analysis. It was a surprising finding of Sisto (2003)
that these distortions diminish in later waves of a panel survey. Rendtel (2005)
used a Markov chain approach to give a statistical explanation for this phe-
nomenon. He coined the term ”Fade-Away Effect”. The core of this approach
is the steady state distribution of a Markov chain. If the transition law of the
Markov chain is stable over time, then (under regularity conditions) the dis-
tribution on the state space of the Markov chain converges to its steady state
distribution. The convergence is independent from the starting distribution at
wave 1 of the panel. However, the transition law between successive states must
be the same for responders and nonresponders. Furthermore, panel attrition
must not be selective after wave 1. In a recent paper Alho et al. (2015) present
an extended methodological treatment of the fade-away effect, which does not
need time-homogeneity of the transitions. They give also some theoretical re-
sults on the speed of the convergence. Also extensions for the treatment of
longitudinal profiles are given there.
This article focusses on three aspects. First we want to replicate results
which were delivered for the Finnish subsample of the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP) for its subsequent survey, the European Statistics on
Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). This concerns mainly the validity of
the key assumption of this approach, namely the equality of the transition law
for respondents and nonrespondents. This can only be done with the help of
register information for the nonrespondents.
The second issue is an extended check of the selectivity of panel attrition in
the Finnish subsample of EU-SILC. In the ideal case panel attrition must not
be selective to guarantee a fade-away effect. As this condition is not exactly
met we use some simulations to demonstate the stability of the fade-away effect
in the presence of moderate deviations form the ideal conditions.
The third issue is the speed of convergence which is equivalent to the size of
the fade-away effect. For empirical applications it is an important parameter. It
makes a difference whether one has to wait 3 or 30 panel waves until a possible
non-response bias has reduced. Here we will use six different bias scenarios to
simulate the speed of the convergence in the 25 national subsamples of EU-SILC.
We will also investigate regional pattern across the EU-member states.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 displays shortly the method-
ological framework of the fade away effect. Section 3 checks the condition of
the same transition law for responders and nonresponders. Section 4 investi-
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gates whether panel attrition can be ignored for the swing-in into the steady
state distribution. Here also the effect of deviations from a strict non-selectivity
of panel attrition is studied. Section 5 compares the speed of convergence to
the steady state distribution over 25 national EU-SILC subsamples. Section 6
concludes.
2 Regularity conditions for the fade-away effect
We assume that the characteristic of interest {Yt}t∈N follows a Markov chain
with state space S = {1, . . . , I}:
P (Yt = j|Yt−1 = i, Yt−2 = st−2, . . . , Y1 = s1) = P (Yt = j|Yt−1 = i)
= pi,j(t)
In order to avoid lengthy expressions we display here the results for a panel
with 4 waves, which is the standard case in EU-SILC. From this case the results
may be easily extrapolated to longer panels. We use the response indicators
R1, R2, R3, R4, where Rt = 1 indicates response and Rt = 0 indicates nonre-
sponse at wave t. The distribution on the state space at wave 4 in the observed
sample, denoted by OBS, is P (Y4 = j4|R1 = 1, R2 = 1, R3 = 1, R4 = 1).
Now by virtue of the Bayes theorem we have:




P (Y4 = j4|Y3 = j3, R1 = 1, R2 = 1, R3 = 1, R4 = 1)




P (Y4 = j4|Y3 = j3, R1 = 1, R2 = 1, R3 = 1, R4 = 1)
×P (R4 = 1|Y3 = j3, R1 = 1, R2 = 1, R3 = 1)
P (R4 = 1|R1 = 1, R2 = 1, R3 = 1)
×P (Y3 = j3|R1 = 1, R2 = 1, R3 = 1) (2)
In order to proceed have to assume that the transition behavior must not depend
on the participation behavior (Assumption A):
P (Y4 = j4|Y3 = j3, R1 = 1, R2 = 1, R3 = 1, R4 = 1) = P (Y4 = j4|Y3 = j3) (3)
Assumption A is equivalent to the missing at random (MAR)assumption,
which states in our case that the probability law of interest, say the distribution
of Y1, Y2, Y3, Y4, is the same for respondents and nonrespondents.
Furthermore we need Assumption B stating that the previous state does not
have a direct effect on the participation in the present wave:
P (R4 = 1|Y3 = j3, R1 = 1, R2 = 1, R3 = 1) = P (R4 = 1|R1 = 1, R2 = 1, R3 = 1)
(4)
By using Assumptions A and B one gets:
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P (Y4 = j4|Y3 = j3)P (Y3 = j3|R1 = 1, R2 = 1, R3 = 1) (5)
Using the same kind of analysis for P (Y3 = j3|R1 = 1, R2 = 1, R3 = 1) and
inserting into eq. 5 one obtains:




P (Y4 = i|Y3 = j3)P (Y3 = j3|Y2 = j2)P (Y2 = j2|R1 = 1, R2 = 1)
Finally we arrive at:




P (Y4 = i|Y3 = j3)P (Y3 = j3|Y2 = j2)P (Y2 = j2|Y1 = j1)
×P (Y1 = j1|R1 = 1) (7)
where the last term P (Y1 = j1|R1 = 1) in eq. (7) is the starting distribution
for the respondents of wave 1 and the summation is done over 3 cycles of the
Markov chain. Denote this distribution by piRESP . If there would have been no
initial nonresponse we would have used in equation (7) the distribution piFULL
based on the gross-sample of the panel. The contraction theorem in Juha et al.
(2015) shows under suitable regularity conditions a uniform convergence of the
distributions in equation (7) for any starting distribution. The regularity condi-
tions of the contraction theorem refer to weak ergodicity and are not restrictive
for our analyses.
In the case of time-homogeneity we have pi,j(t) = pi,j for all t = 1,2, . . ..
This defines the transition matrix P = (pi,j)(i,j=1,...,I). The t-fold transition
matrix P (t) will be denoted by P (t) = (p
(t)
i,j )(i,j=1,...,I). A transition matrix is
called ergodic if there exists a t0 ∈ N such that all p(t0)i,j > 0 for all i, j = 1, . . . , I.
In all our applications we will have t0 = 1. Then there exists a steady state




P ′pi∗ = pi∗ (8)
The speed of convergence to the steady state distribution follows a geometrical
pattern and is given by:
|p(t)ij − pi∗j | = O(|λ2|t) for all i, j ∈ S, t ∈ N (9)
where λ2 is the second largest eigenvalue of P
′, see Juha et al. (2015) for details.
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3 A comparison of the Markovian law for re-
spondents and non-respondents
The fade-away effect bases on the same transition law for respondents and non-
respondents. In order to replicate the findings of Rendtel (2005) for the ECHP
we repeated a similar analysis for EU-SILC.
Junes (2012) investigated the 2006 rotation quarter of the Finnish subsample
of EU-SILC. This rotation group remained in EU-SILC until wave 20091. Of
these 2353 persons 584 persons, about 25 percent, did refuse to participate
in the first wave of SILC. It is possible to compute the disposable household
income for the gross sample from the Finnish national register files. In order
to make comparisons across time and across persons with a different household
composition the disposable household income is divided by the sum of the OECD
weights, which are 1 for the head of the household, 0.5 for every additional adult
and 0.3 for every child under 14 years. This results in the equivalized disposable
income.
We use the framework of a discrete Markov chain between income brackets
which create five income states. The income brackets are chosen such that the
FULL- or gross-sample with 2353 persons is separated into 5 income quintiles2
Finally, we we had to correct the bracket limits for inflation to avoid a trend
in the distribution on the income states. Here we used the increase factor of
the median, which was 1.16 from wave 2006 to wave 2009. All income bracket
boundaries are multiplied by the reciprocal of the corresponding inflation fac-
tor3.
Table 1 compares the distribution on the income brackets for the FULL-
sample and on the RESP -sample, the respondent part of the sample that par-
ticipated in wave one of the ECHP (1996) or SILC (2006). By construction the
distribution for the FULL-sample is identical for both surveys. While we have a
virulent under-representation of high incomes in the ECHP, there is virtually no
bias in the SILC survey. The reason for this different behavior will be probably
due to a different organisation of the field–work: while the ECHP questionnaire
was run as a separate survey meaning some extra respondent burden, the SILC
questionnaire was completely integrated into the general Finnish income survey,
which is a well established survey, see Junes (2012)for details.
Table 2 displays the transition rates between the income states. For each of
the two groups the transitions are pooled over the panel waves. A likelihood
ratio test4 on differences of the transition matrices between the two groups
resulted in 2*(-12189.03 + 12197.07)=16.06 with 5 ∗ 4 = 20 degrees of freedom.
1As the register income is based on taxation records they refer to the previous year. For
this reason Junes (2012) refers to the income years 2005 to 2008.
2There were two alternatives here: the first alternative is to choose the income brackets
according to a design-based analysis. In this case the income brackets refer to the population
quintiles. Or, we may refer to the level of the FULL-sample without using the design weights.
In this case we refer to the pure biasing effect of the nonresponse at the start of the panel. As
the design weights use calibration techniques that try to compensate for a nonresponse bias,
the use of the survey weights might obscure the biasing effect of nonresponse, which is the
issue here. For that reason we did use the unweighted results in our analysis.
3There are different methods of deflation, for example, one might use a consumer price
index. However, deflation is not the main topic of this paper and we simply want to avoid
trends in the distribution of the income states.
4The computations were done with the lem package of Vermunt (1997)
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FULL ECHP SILC
Quintile Sample RESPONDENT Sample RESPONDENT Sample
Q1 20.0 21.8 19.3
Q2 20.0 20.7 20.1
Q3 20.0 21.8 20.0
Q4 20.0 20.1 20.5
Q5 20.0 15.6 20.1
Results from Junes (2012) and Rendtel (2005)
Table 1: Comparison of the initial bias for income quintiles in the ECHP and
SILC
Responders
Quintile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Q1 76.5 16.2 4.4 2.1 0.7
Q2 15.7 57.6 19.1 5.7 1.8
Q3 4.6 17.2 51.4 22.9 3.9
Q4 3.0 5.9 16.1 58.9 16.1
Q5 2.8 1.2 3.3 14.0 78.6
Non-responders
Quintile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Q1 73.9 17.9 5.0 2.1 1.0
Q2 16.8 58.4 17.1 5.8 1.7
Q3 4.2 16.7 55.9 18.5 4.6
Q4 1.2 5.5 15.7 63.9 13.7
Q5 3.7 2.0 3.9 10.1 79.4
Table 2: Transition rates in percent between income states for EU-SILC. Upper
panel: transitions for wave 1 respondents, lower panel: transitions for wave 1
non-respondents
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This results in a p-value of 0.72. Hence the null-hypothesis of equal transition
matrices cannot be rejected for the Finnish subsample of EU SILC.
A similar result was obtained for the ECHP. Such empirical findings do
not hold only for Finland. Juha et al. (2015) report for the German register
based panel on Labour Market and Social Security (PASS = Panel Arbeitsmarkt
und Soziale Sicherung) equal transition laws between the states ”unemployment
benefits (Type II)” (UBII) and ”not UBII”.
For the above comparison we used the time-homogeneity of the Markov
chain. A formal test, which checks the equality of the three transition matrices,
gives a likelihood ratio of 2*(-12169.7 + 12197.1)=54.8 with 2 ∗ 20 = 40 degrees
of freedom. The corresponding p-value is 0.06. The separate estimates of the
transition probabilities, however, don’t exhibit a meaningful trend over time, see
the Appendix. Therefore we will not reject the hypothesis of time-homogeneous
transition matrices. Furthermore, time-homogeneity is not necessary to estab-
lish a fade-away effect, see Juha et al. (2015).
4 Attrition behaviour
4.1 Empirical results for the Finnish SILC subsample
Table 3 compares the nonresponse rate of wave 1 (2005) and the attrition rates
in waves 2, 3 and 4 (2008). It is a typical feature of panel surveys that the
attrition rate sharply decreases after wave 1. This also happens here. However,
a look to the case numbers indicates a cumulation of losses which reduces the
response rate at wave 4 to only 61 % of the gross-sample size at the start of the
panel.
Number of Respon- Response rate Nonres- Attrition-
interviewees dents (Basis 2005) pondents rate
2005 2 353 1 769 75 % 584 25 %
2006 1 769 1 634 69 % 135 8 %
2007 1 634 1 522 65 % 112 7 %
2008 1 522 1 448 61 % 74 5 %
Table 3: Response and attrition rates in the Finnish subsample of EU-SILC
Behr et al (2005) have examined the panel attrition in the national subsam-
ples of the ECHP. They argue that attrition is mainly related to field-work.
In an interviewer-based panel like the ECHP the change of an interviewer has
negative consequences on participation. Residential mobility is also related to
increased attrition as the effort to re-contact the interviewees at the new address
is higher. Often these para-data that describe the field work are unrelated with
the variable of interest, which is the income quintile position here.
A comparison of the income distribution of those who participated in wave
1 (sample RESP) and those who participated in the last wave (sample OBS)
may reveal a possible attrition effect. Table 4 compares the two distributions for
the ECHP (last wave =wave 5) and EU SILC (last wave= wave 4). While for
the ECHP we see only minor discrepancies between the two distributions, the




Quintile FULL RESP OBS FULL RESP OBS
14616 7809 5192 2353 1769 1448
Q1 23.9 22.2 22.4 20.4 20.5 18.9
Q2 16.9 16.6 17.4 19.8 19.3 18.7
Q3 18.3 17.9 17.6 18.7 18.2 18.1
Q4 20.6 21.4 21.8 21.1 21.7 22.2
Q5 20.4 22.0 20.9 20.1 20.4 22.1
Results from Junes (2012) and Rendtel (2005)
Table 4: Comparison of the distribution on income states for the three samples
FULL (All selected persons wave 1), RESP (All respondents wave 1) and OBS
(All observed persons in last wave )
Quintile in Response probabilities
previous wave wave 2 wave 3 wave 4
Q1 0.918 0.868 0.951
Q2 0.901 0.916 0.947
Q3 0.901 0.954 0.948
Q4 0.934 0.953 0.956
Q5 0.964 0.965 0.954
Table 5: Comparison of the impact of the income quintile position in previous
panel wave on the attrition probability
of the above median incomes and under-representation of low incomes, see Junes
(2012).
A direct check of Assumption B is given in Table 5. It displays the estimated
response probabilities according to the income state in the previous panel wave.
At waves 2 and 3 persons with low income states have a significantly lower
response probability than persons in the upmost income state. The differences
are about 5 percent points. However, this tendency has completely disappeared
in wave 4 where there are virtually no differences with respect to income states.
Thus there is no indication of a constant fixed link between income position and
attrition that is established by some kind of habit.
In order to get a deeper insight about the impact of income on attrition we
used a local regression approach (Loader 1999) to demonstrate the impact of
the unclassified income on the probability to respond. Figure 1 displays the
estimated probabilities and their confidence intervals. For the computation the
R-Package locfit was used, see Loader (2013).
The results from Figure 1 re-state the findings from Table 5. For waves 2
and 3 persons with lower incomes in the previous wave have the tendency to
respond with lower probability. However, there is not a global trend over the
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Figure 1: Local regression of the impact of the income in previous wave on panel
attrition
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4.2 Simulations of initial nonresponse and panel attrition
The results on attrition may be somewhat misleading as there is almost no
initial nonresponse bias for SILC. With a substantial initial nonresponse bias
there are also larger effects of the swing-in into the steady state distribution
that have to be balanced against an attrition effect. Therefore we simulate a
substantial initial nonresponse bias and investigate the effect of deviations from
Assumption B.
For the simulation runs we used a joint transition matrix P that is estimated
from the respondents and non-respondents. It is a mixture of the transition
matrices displayed in Table 2. The values can be found in the appendix in
Table 11. We use 6 different starting distributions of the Markov chain as an
artificial RESP sample, which are displayed in Table 6.
Starting Distribution
1 2 3 4 5 6
Q1 0.218 0.235 0.320 0.135 0.150 0.300
Q2 0.207 0.200 0.250 0.165 0.225 0.160
Q3 0.218 0.225 0.190 0.215 0.240 0.100
Q4 0.201 0.210 0.150 0.225 0.225 0.150
Q5 0.156 0.130 0.090 0.260 0.160 0.290
Table 6: Starting distributions of the RESP-sample on the quintile positions
Q1 to Q5 in 6 different simulation scenarios
Scenario 1 is the situation of the Finnish ECHP at it’s start with an under-
representation of the persons in the upmost quintile. In Scenario 2 the situation
is even somewhat more skew with an additional moderate over-representation
of the lowest quintile. Scenario 3 is even more extreme with a substantial over-
representation of the lowest quintile and a substantial under-representation of
the upmost quintile. Scenario 4 is in the opposite direction. Here the poor
people are under-represented while the rich persons are over-represented. In
Scenario 5 we have an over-representation of the mid-quintile positions. And
finally scenario 6 displays a situation where the extreme categories are over-
represented.
If we measure the initial nonresponse bias by the Euclidian distance to the
distribution of the FULL-Sample, which is (0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2,0.2), we get the val-
ues displayed in Table 7
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6
0.0513 0.0828 0.1778 0.0995 0.0834 0.1794
Table 7: Initial Nonresponse bias the 6 scenarios of the simulation runs
These 6 nonresponse scenarios are combined with 6 attrition scenarios which
are displayed in Table 9. Each row represents a different attrition scenario. The
first 5 columns display the response probabilities with respect to the previous
income position. The last column under symbol | · | measures the maximum
difference between the response probabilities, which is a measure of selective
attrition.
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Table 8: Six attrition scenarios with differential response probabilities in each
panel wave
Attrition
scenario p(Q1) p(Q2) p(Q3) p(Q4) p(Q5) | · |
A 0.9120 0.9242 0.9364 0.9485 0.9607 0.05
B 0.8570 0.8935 0.9164 0.9475 0.9718 0.11
C 0.8000 0.8532 0.9365 0.9607 0.9807 0.18
D 0.9720 0.9443 0.9274 0.9185 0.8790 0.10
E 0.9020 0.9242 0.9663 0.9424 0.9020 0.06
F 0.9720 0.9242 0.8564 0.9085 0.9420 0.12
Table 9: Six attrition scenarios with differential response probabilities in each
panel wave
Attrition scenario A reflects a linear trend in the probability to respond.
The maximum difference in the response rates is 5 percentage points which
is regarded as a mild violation of Assumption B. Scenario B increases this
difference to 11 percentage points and generates a clear differential attrition
between low and high income people. Scenario C is even more dramatic in the
same direction. Scenario D reverses Scenario B. Now the rich ones are not so
willing to cooperate. A two sided approach is displayed in Scenario E. Here the
extreme categories have a lower tendency to stay in the panel. Finally, Scenario
F reflects a situation where the extreme categories are more cooperative than
the middle income groups.
These response probabilities are applied for the 3 transitions to waves 2, 3
and 4. They are combined with the 6 initial bias scenarios. We compare at each
wave t = 1,2,3,4 the simulated distribution on the state space for the FULL-
sample, the RESP -sample and finally the OBS-sample, the net-sample at wave
t, which resulted from attrition. Denote the Euclidian distance between the dis-
tributions in FULL and the RESP sample in wave t by BFRt . Similarly, B
FO
t B
denotes the distance between the FULL and the OBS sample in wave t. These
distances are used here as measures for the absolute bias of the nonresponse.
Figure 2 compares the decline of BFRt (solid line) and B
FO
t (one line for each
of the 6 attrition scenarios). All 6 scenarios demonstrate a substantial conver-
gence of the distribution of RESP -sample to the distribution of the FULL-
sample within 3 successive panel waves. This is a consequence of the second
eigenvalue of the transition matric P , which is λ2=0.816. Because of (λ2)
3=
0.54 we can expect the bias to decrease by a factor of about 0.54. The violation
of Assumption B (no selective attrition) leads in most cases to a variation of the
decrease around the RESP -sample line. However, the monotone decrease pat-
tern is preserved in 28 out of 36 cases. There are 7 cases with a non-monotone
pattern where the bias re-increases in wave 3 or 4. This happens in the scenarios
1B , 1C ,1D ,2C , 4C and 5C. Attrition scenario C represents the most severe
violation of Assumption B with a response differential of 18 percentage points,
that is applied repeatedly. Such a stable, highly selective drift seems to be rare
for real panels. In most cases moderate violations of assumption B will dampen
or accelerate the fade-away effect. So the combination of the scenarios 1, 2, 3
with over-representation of the high incomes with the attrition scenarios D, E
11
and F dampen the fade-away effect. However, the monotone pattern persists!
Response pattern A and E with a response differential of about 5 percentage
points have almost no effect on the fade-away effect.
In order judge the attrition effect on the speed of the fade-away effect we






1 . Table 10 compares
the relative bias for the 6 attrition scenarios with the RESP -sample. Here
small values indicate a high fade-away effect. If the relative bias is 15 % above
the corresponding RESP -value we mark the combination of the start and the
attrition scenario with red color. In case of a relative bias less than 15 % of
the corresponding RESP -value we use a green mark. Table 10 reveals 27 (out
of 36) fields which are uncoloured. 12 red fields have to be balanced against 7
green fields.
Scenario attrition
Scenario at start A B C D E F RESP
1 0.20 0.38 0.90 1.00 0.59 0.75 0.47
2 0.28 0.20 0.47 0.77 0.49 0.62 0.45
3 0.46 0.34 0.21 0.69 0.51 0.66 0.55
4 0.71 0.92 1.14 0.25 0.55 0.53 0.54
5 0.34 0.55 0.83 0.40 0.46 0.09 0.28
6 0.30 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.20 0.40 0.28
Table 10: Relative bias for RESP und OBS after four waves (Red areas: relative
bias 15 % above RESP-value. Green areas: relative bias 15 % less RESP-value.
The results of this section refer to Finnish data. Misselbeck (2014) analysed
also a transition matrix gained from the Iceland subsample of SILC under the
same framework. The results were quite similar to the ones reported here de-
spite substantial differences in the transition behavior in Iceland. Therefore we
resume that selective attrition does not contradict the fade-away effect per se.
The critical point is a strong selective attrition process which lasts permanently
over all panel waves.
5 A comparison of the fade-away effect in 25
EU-SILC subsamples
The distribution of income states is one of the core variables of EU-SILC. Here
we use the equivalized household income which establishes comparability over
households with different composition. In order to establish comparability over
time we have also to use some deflation of the income brackets that define the
income classes. The results of this section are taken from Dietz (2012), who used
the consumer price index for deflation5 In order to facilitate the comparison
across countries we used here the cross-sectional design weights to establish
5This differs from the approach in the previous section where we used the ratio of the



























































































































































Figure 2: Absolute bias for 6 different starting scenarios (1 to 6) and 6 different
attrition scenarios (A to F)
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national quintile intervals. For the longitudinal analysis we used the longitudinal
SILC weights6.
The following analysis uses 25 sub-samples based on the EU-SILC User Data
Base, taking into account 23 EU Member States7 plus Norway and Iceland.
Figure 3 displays some characteristics of these 25 states included in this analysis.
The case numbers refer to the longitudinal cohorts that participate over 4 waves
(2006 – 2009). There is an apparent variation of the median income and the
Gini-coefficient.
Figure 3: Number of Observations, Median, Minimum and Maximum in Eu-
ros and Gini coefficient of net-equivalence income (2006), (Source: EU-SILC,
Calculations taken from Dietz (2012))
Figures 4 and 5 display the estimated transition matrices between the succes-
sive income quintiles. The time period covers the years 2006 to 2009. There are
remarkable differences between the transitions matrices within the EU. For ex-
ample, the probability to stay in the lowest quintile ranges from 0.39 for Latvia
(LV) to 0.84 for Cyprus (CY). With respect to the highest income quintile Slove-
nia (SI) is the most stable country with a probability of 0.90 while Island (IS)
has become the most risky country for high incomes with a probability of 0.57.
Island is also a country where transitions to the next lower quintile are more
frequent than transitions to the next higher quintile position. Just the opposite
pattern can be found in Norway (NO). Here the risk to reach the next higher
quintile is always higher than the risk to fall down one position.
6These methodological differences may explain the different values for Finland, where the
results of the previous section will differ from the transition matrix displayed in Figure 4
below.
7Some EU Member states, for example Germany, are missing as they do not provide
longitudinal data for this data base.
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Figure 4: Transition matrix between income quintiles for 12 EU-Member states
(Source: EU-SILC, values taken from Dietz (2012))
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Figure 5: Transition matrix between income quintiles for 11 EU-Member states
plus NO and IS (Source: EU-SILC, values taken from Dietz (2012))
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With the SILC user data base (UDB), the initial non-response bias can not
be observed, therefore we decided to run a simulation experiment to demonstrate
how fast the distribution on the quintiles swings back into the steady state dis-
tribution. For the transitions between the quintiles we assume the Assumptions
A and B.
The nonresponse bias is simulated by using the six initial distributions, we
used for our analysis with Finland. As the main focus is here on the different
speed of the fade-away effect we did not analyse possible effects of selective
attrition.
In the following tables we will use a global measure over all income states.




q where bq is
the bias for quintile q. Therefore, the absolute bias is equal for all countries is
in the base year 2006 in each of the 6 scenarios. The value differs between the
scenarios. It’s value is respectively 0.0513, 0.0828, 0.1778, 0.0995 0.0834 and
0.1794. Figure 6 displays the decrease of absolute bias with each panel wave.
Until wave 4 in 2009 we observe for all subsamples substantial decreases of this
absolute bias. However , the speed of the fade-away process varies substantially
between the different scenarios. For the Scenarios 3 and 6 we also see substan-
tial differences across the different SILC sub-samples. Scenario 3 refers to a
monotonic over-representation of the low incomes, while Scenario 6 refers to the
under-representation of the middle income classes.
The speed of the convergence can be best displayed by the ratio of the
absolute bias in two subsequent waves.. Therefore we compare the relative bias
B2009/B2006. Figure 7 orders the countries according to their relative bias in
Scenario 1. Here, Bulgaria is the country with the largest reduction of the
absolute bias (factor 0.26), while Finland turned out to be the country with
the least bias reduction (factor 0.61). The ranking of the countries with respect
to this reduction factor is quite stable across the different scenarios. Figure 7
displays also for Bulgaria and Finland the absolute bias in 2009 B2009. For the
other countries an absolute bias less 2.24 % are displayed with a grey field.
Finally Figure 8 compares the relative bias of column 1 (Scenario 1) of
Figure 7 according to their geographical distribution. While there seems to be
a pattern of countries with a slow fade-away effect in Northern Europe there is
no clear geographical pattern with respect to medium or fast fade-away effect.
However, the speed of the swing-in into the steady state distribution depends
on the diagonal of the transition matrix, i.e. the probability to stay in the
same income quintile. Figure 9 classifies the SILC countries according to their
average stability figures which are computed by the mean of the diagonal of the
transition matrix. This classification resembles the fade-away effect of Figure 8
quite well. Thus we have arrived at an economic interpretation of the fade-away
effect: If the regularity assumption for fade-away apply, the effect will be largest
in countries with the lowest stability in income positions.
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Figure 6: Decline of the absolute bias in the national sub-samples under six
different scenarios for initial distribution at wave one (2006). Each country is
displayed by a different color (Source:EU-SILC, Calculations taken from Dietz
(2012))
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Figure 7: Bias in 2009 as ratio of the bias in 2006 by country and scenario
(Source:EU-SILC, Calculations taken from Dietz 2012)
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Figure 8: The stability of the relative of the relative initial bias (2006) in 2009
(Source:EU-SILC, Calculations taken from Dietz(2012))
Figure 9: Classification of SILC countries according to their average stability




The size of the fade-away effect depends on the specific convergence properties
of the characteristic of interest. Income transitions between income states are a
central issue of EU-SILC. Our results display remarkable differences in the speed
of the convergence to the steady state distribution between the EU-member
states, depending on the stability of the income position.
Even if the regularity conditions for the fade away effect are not perfectly met
an initial nonresponse bias will decline rapidly within 4 panel waves. Further-
more, it is not necessary for the FULL-sample distribution is near the steady
state distribution. As shown by Juha et al. (2015) differences between the
FULL-sample and the RESP-sample fade-away in a similar geometric decrease
pattern. Even if there exists no steady state distribution, like in the case of a
time-inhomogeneous Markov chain, the differences between between the FULL-
and the RESP -sample decline as long as they both follow the same transition
law, see Juha et al. (2015). Thus Assumption A turns out to be essential,
while mild violations of Assumption B will not turn down the fade-away effect
in principle. Only stable attrition differentials larger than 10 percentage points
have the potential to counteract the transition laws of income mobility in a
substantive way.
In the case that the population is near a steady state distribution large
cross-sectional surveys, like a micro-census, should resemble the steady state
distribution in the population. Therefore long running panels should converge
to this distribution. Fitzgerald et al. (1998) state in their evaluation of the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) after 30 years a decrease of the distri-
butional differences of the design-weighted PSID results and US micro-census
counts. Calibration to micro-census counts is a standard routine to compensate
for nonresponse, see for example Estevao/Sa¨rndal (2006) and Sa¨rndal (2007).
However, we can estimate a steady state distribution also from a panel. There-
fore Juha et al. (2015) propose to use the steady state distribution for calibra-
tion purposes. This approach has the advantage that we can calibrate to the
steady state of the variable of interest, which is in most cases not delivered by
a micro-census.
The national subsamples of EU-SILC are mostly rotation panels where the
respondents stay for four waves in the survey and are then dismissed. The pe-
riod of four waves was motivated to record longitudinal measures of poverty, for
example being at least two times out four subsequent measurements regarded
as poor, see for example Atkinson/Marlier(2010). However, panels with longer
observation periods are possible and offer increased opportunities for longitu-
dinal research, for example the PSID since 1968, the SOEP since 1984 or the
BHPS since 1991, to name only a few.
A short rotation period may be motivated by case number arguments as
panel attrition has the tendency to melt down the sample size. Also the coverage
of immigrants with the new rotation groups might be regarded as an argument
for shorter and therefore larger rotation groups. The fade-away effect argues for
longer rotation periods as every ”refreshment”-sample by a new rotation group
is under the risk to incur a fresh initial wave nonresponse bias. The alternative
is a longer observation period with more reliable data. Low case numbers can be
anticipated by a first wave sample, that is high enough to guarantee reasonable
case numbers also in later panel waves. The coverage of immigrants can be
21
realized with specialized immigrant samples. Therefore our results support the
recommendation to prolongate the panel rotation interval from four to six years.
Such a change is discussed by Eurostat and the national statistical institutes of
the EU member states.
References
Alho, Juha; Spencer, Bruce (2005): Statistical Demography and Forecasting,
Springer Verlag
Atkinson, Anthony; Marlier, Eric (eds) (2010): Income and Living conditions
in Europe. Eurostat, doi:10.2785/53320
Behr, Andreas; Bellgardt, Egon; Rendtel, Ulrich (2005): Extent and Determi-
nants of Panel Attrition in the European Community Household Panel.
European Sociological Review. Vol. 21, 489-512
Dietz, Ferdinand-Paul(2014): Die zeitliche Entwicklung des Nonresponse Bias
in Panelerhebungen am Beispiel der Einkommensmobilita¨t in EU-SILC.
(In German: The temporal development of the nonresponse bias in panel
surveys: The example of income mobility in EU-SILC. Bachelor thesis at
the Economic Department of the FU Berlin, Berlin.
Estevao, Victor; Sa¨rndal, C.-E. (2006):Survey Estimates by Calibration on
Complex Auxiliary Information. Internat. Statist. Rev. Volume 74,
127-147.
Fitzgerald, John; Gottschalk, Peter; Moffitt, Robert (1998): An Analysis of
Sample Attrition in Panel Data - The Michigan Panel Study of Income
Dynamics. Journal of Human Resources 33, 251-299.
Hill, Martha (1991): The Panel Study of Income Dynamics- A User’s Guide.
Sage Publications
Junes, Tara (2012): Initial wave nonresponse and panel attrition in the Finnish
subsample of EU-SILC, Master Thesis at the Department of Social Statis-
tics, University of Helsinki, Helsinki.
Misselbeck, Karla (2014): Der Fade-Away Effekt in Panel Surveys. Empirische
Resultate fu¨r die finnische Teilstichprobe von EU-SILC. ( In German: The
Fade-Away effect in panel syurveys. Empirical results for the Finnish
subsample of EU-SILC), Master Thesis at the Economic Department of
the FU Berlin, Berlin.
Rendtel, Ulrich (2003): Attrition Effects in the European Community House-
hold panel, Bulletin of the ISI 54th Session, Contributed Papers, Volume
LX, Book 2, 316-317
Rendtel, Ulrich (2013): The fade-away effect of initial nonresponse in panel sur-
veys: Empirical results for EU-SILC. Eurostat Methodologies and Work-
ingpapers (ISSN 1977-0375) Edition 2013, doi:10.2785/21863
22
Sa¨rndal, Carl-Eric (2007): The calibration approach in survey theory and prac-
tice. Survey Methodology, 33, 99–119.
Sisto, J.(2003): Attrition Effects on the Design Based Estimates of Disposable
Household Income. Chintex Working Paper no. 9 03/2003 http://www.
destatis.de/jetspeed/portal/cms/Sites/destatis/Internet/DE/Content/
Wissenschaftsforum/Chintex/
Vermunt, Jeroen (1997): lem- User Manual, University Tilburg, Tilburg
23
Appendix
For the simulation runs the transition matrix of Table 11 was used.
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
1 75.9 16.6 4.5 2.1 0.8
2 16.0 57.8 18.6 5.7 1.8
3 4.5 17.1 52.5 21.8 4.0
4 2.6 5.8 16.0 60.1 16.5
5 3.0 1.4 3.5 13.3 78.8
Table 11: Transition rates in percent between income quintiles. Estimated from
transitions for respondents and non-respondents, pooled over waves 2 to 4.
A separate estimation of transition probabilities between for panel waves 2,
3 and 4 is displayed in Table 12 :
State at State at End
Start Transition 1 2 3 4 5
1 Y2|Y1 75.1 18.1 3.8 1.9 1.0
1 Y3|Y2 77.8 14.1 4.4 2.7 1.0
1 Y4|Y3 74.7 17.7 5.4 1.8 0.4
2 Y2|Y1 16.7 56.7 18.8 5.7 1.9
2 Y3|Y2 17.6 57.2 16.7 7.3 1.1
2 Y4|Y3 13.6 59.5 20.4 4.1 2.5
3 Y2|Y1 4.5 15.5 50.6 24.7 4.7
3 Y3|Y2 4.4 19.9 53.6 18.3 3.7
3 Y4|Y3 4.6 16.2 53.6 22.2 3.7
4 Y2|Y1 2.7 5.7 14.0 59.5 18.0
4 Y3|Y2 2.1 3.7 19.8 59.8 14.6
4 Y4|Y3 2.9 7.9 14.1 61.1 13.9
5 Y2|Y1 3.4 1.5 3.4 10.2 81.5
5 Y3|Y2 3.4 1.6 3.0 13.7 76.4
5 Y4|Y3 2.2 1.0 4.0 15.9 76.8
Table 12: Transition rates in percent between income quintiles for EU-SILC:
The values in each cell refer to transition 1/2, transition 2/3 and transition 3/4.
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